A Motivated Audience: An Analysis of Motivated Reasoning and Presidential Campaign Debates by Mullinix, Kevin John
 
A Motivated Audience: 
 
An Analysis of Motivated Reasoning and Presidential Campaign Debates 
 
By 
 
Copyright 2011 
Kevin J. Mullinix 
 
 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
 
 
________________________________        
    Chairperson Mark R. Joslyn  
            
 
________________________________        
Donald P. Haider-Markel 
 
 
________________________________        
Michael S. Lynch 
 
 
 
Date Defended: March 11, 2011 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
The Thesis Committee for Kevin J. Mullinix 
 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 
 
A Motivated Audience: 
 
An Analysis of Motivated Reasoning and Presidential Campaign Debates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
 Chairperson Mark R. Joslyn 
 
 
       
Date approved: March 11, 2011 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
Recent innovations in psychology bolster an information processing theory of motivated 
reasoning. However, there are few attempts to apply the theory outside of a laboratory setting, 
and it is limited in its application to only a few political phenomena. I argue that presidential 
campaign debates present unique case studies to test the theory. There is a wealth of scholarly 
literature that examines presidential debates. Much of this research examines the effects of 
debates on learning political information, candidate evaluation, and vote choice. Only a few of 
these studies are buttressed with a psychological model of how individuals process information. 
In this study I apply motivated reasoning to disentangle the mechanisms through which 
individuals process debate information. Using national panel data sets, I analyze pre and post 
responses to presidential debates in both 1996 and 2008. I find strong support for a prior attitude 
effect and polarization. More interestingly and consistent with theory, the effects are conditioned 
by levels of interest. The effects of campaign debates are strongest for motivated individuals 
with high levels of interest. This study presents a propitious opportunity to fill gaps in existing 
literature and provide a fruitful test and extension of an emerging theory.
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INTRODUCTION: 
 Much of political science research concerns how people make sense of what Walter 
Lippmann (1925, p. 24) called the “mystery off there,” and the “swarming confusion of 
problems.” Politics is complex. As such, research strives to understand how people not only 
perceive their political world, but how they process, interpret, and evaluate political information. 
Some scholars build theoretical frameworks using assumptions concerning the rational faculties 
of individuals (Downs 1957). Other work recognizes the cognitive limitations of individuals and 
emphasizes a bounded rationality (Simon 1985). Research in psychology suggests that people 
cope with cognitive limitations by using heuristics, shortcuts, stereotypes, and schemas to 
simplify and organize information (Lau 2003). Recent innovations in psychology suggest that 
individuals do not simply organize and process information in an even-handed and objective 
manner. Instead, individuals unconsciously employ motives and biases in their processing of 
political information (Taber and Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2005). 
Methodological and theoretical advances have uncovered these biases and bolster support 
for the theory of motivated reasoning (Burdein et al. 2006; Kim et al. 2010; Lebo and Cassino 
2007; Lodge and Taber 2005; Taber et al. 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006; Slothuus and de Vreese 
2010; Redlawsk et al. 2010). This emerging literature examines the mechanisms involved in 
information processing. Mullinix (2011), states that “the theory unites affect and cognition to 
assert that an individual‟s prior attitudes toward people, groups, and issues will bias how he or 
she processes new information concerning those topics” (p66). The theory is often coupled with 
five related hypotheses. First, there is a prior attitude effect where individuals view evidence 
congruent with prior attitudes as more compelling. Second and closely related, there is a 
confirmation bias where individuals seek out confirming arguments over disconfirming 
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arguments. Next, there is a disconfirmation bias where people counter-argue information that is 
incongruent with prior attitudes. Fourth, the biases result in polarization and the promotion of 
more extreme attitudes. Finally, evidence suggests that these effects are heightened for the most 
politically aware individuals with high levels of sophistication and strong prior attitudes. The 
theory is strongly supported by laboratory research; however, it is rarely examined outside the 
laboratory setting and it has been quite limited in its application to political phenomena. I suggest 
that presidential campaign debates provide excellent case studies to test the theory outside of a 
laboratory and apply it to an important political activity. 
 Presidential campaign debates present the citizenry with an opportunity to learn about the 
candidates and their respective policy preferences. There is a large and diverse body of literature 
that examines debates for their strategies and effects on the viewing public. Some scholars 
specifically examine rhetoric, framing, and priming effects (Fridkin et al. 2007; Jerit 2009). 
Other researchers highlight the influence of debates on political learning, and candidate and 
issue-specific knowledge (Miller and MacKuen 1979; Wald and Lupfer 1978; Benoit and 
Hansen 2004; Lemert 1993; Holbrook 1999). In analyzing the source of debate effects, only a 
few studies explicitly examine individual level psychological theories. One study unites framing 
and priming literature with schema theory (Hwang et al. 2007). Other analyses employ cognitive 
consistency theory (Abramowitz 1978; Sigelman and Sigelman 1984; Lanoue 1992). The small 
number of studies that actually employ a psychological theory often lack precision in their 
explanations and predictions. For example, cognitive consistency theory helps explain why 
individuals may reinforce their existing attitudes towards candidates in a debate, but it fails to 
explain who is most likely to engage in these practices. Thus, the state of research inadequately 
addresses the cognitive processes through which individuals respond to debates. 
3 
 
 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide an appropriate and logical extension of motivated 
reasoning to fill gaps in the existing presidential campaign debate literature. The study tests the 
motivated reasoning theory outside of the laboratory with nationally representative samples. The 
theory presents a novel opportunity to explain why individuals respond to debates in the manner 
that they do. Using panel data from the first presidential debates in both 1996 and 2008, I test for 
a prior attitude effect, polarization, and heightened effects for the most politically interested 
individuals. In doing so, this analysis speaks to the inability of individuals to even-handedly 
process and evaluate political information without bias. 
 The paper is divided into several sections. First, I provide a more thorough discussion of 
the motivated reasoning theory. Next, I present a review of the presidential campaign debate 
literature. Building on the theory and literature, I explicitly illuminate hypotheses for testing. I 
then present my research design, operationalization of variables, and results. Finally, the 
implications of the study are examined in a concluding section. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: 
 Motivated reasoning is a theory that addresses how people process, evaluate, and respond 
to incoming information. Before examining its elements, I believe it is necessary to first discuss 
its origins. Motivated reasoning‟s underlying assumptions are rooted in psychology and 
information processing (Kunda 1990; Druckman et al. 2009)
1
. In the early stages of its 
application to politics (Lodge and Taber 2000), the theory was perceived as an extension and 
outgrowth of online processing models (Hastie and Park 1986; Lodge et al. 1995). Online 
processing models suggest that individuals keep a running tally of evaluations that is used for 
                                                 
1
 Herrmann (2003) traces the origins of motivated reasoning in respect to image theory and international relations to 
Richard Cottam (1977) whose work builds upon the balance theory of Fritz Heider (1958). 
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political evaluations. Online processing models are typically contrasted with memory based 
models where individuals store and access information in their memory. Although the online 
models are open to the inclusion of affect, they are typically perceived as “cold” cognition 
models. That is, online processing is a simple cognitive strategy where individuals keep a 
running evaluative tally. 
 Building upon online processing, motivated reasoning adds several elements. First, affect 
is given a central role which has led to the “hot cognition hypothesis.” The hot cognition 
hypothesis argues that “all sociopolitical concepts are affect laden” (Lodge and Taber 2005, pp. 
456). Mullinix (2011) states that “In sum, individuals develop affective charges concerning 
various topics over time, and these prior motivations significantly influence how people process 
new information” (pp. 5).  The affective charges are activated automatically within milliseconds 
upon exposure to a concept (Lodge and Taber 2005). The automaticity of affect is often 
measured using timed implicit association and response latency tests that buttress support for the 
unconscious influence of affect on political evaluations (Burdein et al. 2006; Lodge and Taber 
2005). 
 Second, the role of affect leads to predictable biases. If all political concepts are affect-
laden and the affect is triggered unconsciously and automatically upon exposure to a concept, 
then the activation of the affect will influence how an individual processes incoming 
information. Tests of motivated reasoning document support for five common hypotheses: a 
prior attitude effect, confirmation bias, disconfirmation bias, polarization, and heightened effects 
for political sophisticates (Taber and Lodge 2006). The prior attitude effect suggests that 
individuals are likely to perceive arguments congruent with their prior attitudes as stronger than 
opposing arguments. Closely related is the confirmation bias where individuals are more likely to 
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seek out confirming arguments over disconfirming arguments. The disconfirmation bias suggests 
that individuals will use more time and cognitive resources to counter argue incongruent 
arguments than congruent arguments. These biases result in polarization and more extreme 
attitudes when people have been exposed to both pro and con arguments. Strong evidence from 
experimental settings supports these effects with respect to a number of political issues (Taber 
and Lodge 2006; Taber et al. 2009).  
 Finally, motivated reasoning suggests that the individuals most likely and most apt to 
employ these biases are highly politically sophisticated, knowledgeable, and interested citizens. 
Also, they are the individuals with the strongest prior attitudes and motivations (Taber and 
Lodge 2006). Politically sophisticated and interested individuals with stronger attitudes and 
motivations are likely to have stronger unconscious affect. The stronger attitudes and affect are 
shown to facilitate biases and influence reaction times (Lodge and Taber 2005). The unconscious 
affect filters the processing of information. The more politically sophisticated an individual is, 
the more likely he or she has stronger motivations and affect that bias the processing of political 
information. 
Lebo and Cassino (2007) use partisan attachments as motivations to examine presidential 
approval, and find support for the theory. Kim et al. (2010) develop a computational model of 
the citizen as a motivated reasoner and find support for these effects for candidate evaluations. 
Research does suggest that there is a “tipping point” for motivated reasoners confronted with 
information incongruent with expectations (Redlawsk et al. 2010). That is, when presented with 
large amount of information that is inconsistent with prior attitudes, there is a threshold at which 
individuals no longer reinforce priors nor push away the opposing information. Despite the rich 
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empirical support for the theory, there are only a few applications of the theory beyond the 
laboratory setting (Slothuus and de Vreese 2010; Kim et al. 2010; Lebo and Cassino 2007). 
 Taken together, the theory provides a precise explanation and prediction for how 
individuals will process new information. All political concepts are affect-laden, and this affect 
is triggered automatically upon exposure to a concept. This unconscious affect biases how people 
evaluate the incoming information, which in turn leads to a polarization of attitudes.  Individuals 
who are more politically sophisticated, and have stronger prior attitudes accentuate these biases. 
Thus, motivated reasoning provides an excellent opportunity to understand how people process 
and evaluate candidates, opposing arguments, and information in presidential debates. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
 Presidential debates have been analyzed from multiple perspectives. Researchers have 
tackled a myriad of issues surrounding campaign debates using a variety of methodological and 
theoretical approaches. Some scholars analyze presidential debates from a historical and 
descriptive perspective, and have documented their growth (Swerdlow 1987; Jamieson 1996). 
Other research examines the role of television and debates, and highlights the political benefits 
of campaign debates. These benefits can include the role of debates to reveal candidate 
communication competence, increase accountability, check manipulative tendencies, prepare 
candidates for office, and reduce costs of reaching voters (Jamieson 1987). Other literature 
specifically discusses the influence of presidential debates on voting and voter turnout (Gallup, 
Jr. 1987). Some research takes a comprehensive approach to debates and examines the role of 
television, debate format, coverage, effects, and policy (Kraus 2000; Hellweg et al 1992; 
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Jamieson and Birdsell 1988). Despite the breadth of studies concerning debates, I will provide a 
brief review of a few specific analyses in the literature. 
 The importance of rhetoric for both campaign debates and the office of the President is 
well-documented (Campbell and Jamieson 2008; Jamieson 1988). Due to its significance, several 
studies examine campaign debates from a perspective of rhetorical strategy. Jerit (2009) 
compares dueling policy predictions that employ differing rhetorical strategies to help 
understand the impact of competing frames in debates. She finds evidence that strategies of 
predictive appeals and direct rebuttals have different impacts on the viewer. Examining televised 
discourse broadly, Mutz (2007) reveals that even camera angles can influence perceptions of 
civility and legitimacy. 
 Other research highlights the influence and effects of campaign debates.  Lanoue and 
Schrott (1989) find significant opinion change in response to televised presidential debates. They 
suggest explanations involving oratory skills and issue positions. Other scholars highlight 
substantial, significant, and lasting presidential debate effects on public opinion and candidate 
evaluations (Shaw 1992). One intriguing study documents not only that citizens can be 
influenced by the arguments made by candidates in the debate, but also by the media‟s instant 
analysis of debate performance (Fridkin et al. 2007). The authors use framing and priming theory 
to not only understand how the candidates can influence opinions, but how particular media 
coverage can emphasize certain characteristics and prime evaluations. Certainly, framing and 
priming theories are rooted in psychology, but they are limited in their ability to explain the 
precise mechanisms through which individuals process information. For example, little attention 
is given to the importance and influence of the characteristics of the individual watching the 
debate. Instead, the focus is only on the frame, source, and content of a message. Hwang et al. 
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(2007) address some of these individual-level concerns by uniting framing, priming, and schema 
theory. However, their focus is on post-debate news analysis, and not the debate itself. 
  A larger body of literature analyzes the influence of campaign debates on political 
learning and knowledge. One study finds that people do learn from debates, but this learning is 
influenced by context (Holbrook 1999). The author finds that early debates generate more 
learning, and people tend to learn more about unfamiliar candidates. Miller and Mackuen (1979) 
boldly assert that “The 1976 presidential debates produced a better informed electorate than 
would have been the case without them. Watching the debates increased the level of manifest 
information that all citizens had about the candidates regardless of their education, political 
involvement, or general information-seeking habits” (pp. 344). Jamieson (2000) documents 
similar results in more recent elections. Other research finds support for political learning from 
debates, as well as effects for global attitudes and basic orientations to the political system (Wald 
and Lupfer 1978). Benoit and Hansen (2004) provide evidence that debates can instill knowledge 
and change impressions of candidate character. Some scholars situate their studies of debates and 
political learning in the literature surrounding the “knowledge gap” (Lemert 1993). The author 
claims “Flawed and underemphasized as the 1988 presidential debates may have been, they 
added to citizens‟ knowledge base” (pp. 93).  
 To adequately grasp the effects of campaign debates, scholars must not only examine the 
outcomes and effects of debates on opinion, but also the underlying mechanisms that explain 
why the effects occur. For example, Benoit and Hansen (2004) find that debates are more likely 
to strengthen existing preferences rather than alter vote preference. Despite the findings, the 
authors fail to thoroughly explain why this occurred. The authors point to previous studies on 
issue learning and character perception, but they lack a psychological justification for their 
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results. Other research also reveals that the influence of campaign events, including debates, is 
conditional on previous preferences and partisans dispositions (Hillygus and Jackman 2003). 
Similar to Benoit and Hansen, these authors lend support to the idea that individuals who watch 
the debate are likely to reinforce and be influenced by preexisting preferences, but the authors 
inadequately explain why this occurs. Other studies also document the ability of debates to 
strengthen existing opinions but do not provide a strong theoretical explanation (Sears et al. 
1964; Holbert 2005). Opinion reinforcement is not an entirely new finding. Although not 
specifically discussing presidential campaign debates, Klapper (1960, p. 15) concludes that 
“mass communication functions far more frequently as an agent of reinforcement than as an 
agent of change.” Kinder (2003 p. 370) discusses presidential campaigns broadly and asserts that 
“For many partisans, the details brought forward by any particular campaign are simply further 
corroboration of their party‟s comparative virtuosity.” 
Several researchers find results of attitude reinforcement, and use a psychological theory 
of cognitive consistency (Lanoue 1992; Abramowitz 1978; Sigelman and Sigelman 1984; 
Abelson et al. 1968). In discussing this theory, Abramowitz (1978) states “there is a strain 
toward consistency among attitudes. Inconsistency tends to produce psychological discomfort; 
therefore, inconsistent attitudes tend to be unstable” (pp. 681). Scholars use cognitive 
consistency to explain why presidential debates reinforce existing predispositions rather than 
substantially change opinions. Sigelman and Sigelman (1984) assert that “In any event, it is clear 
that the public does not approach presidential debates cognitively unencumbered and determined 
to weigh the evidence even-handedly. Only when the powerful impacts of prior beliefs and 
preferences are considered can one fully understand why presidential debates have not had the 
marked influence on election outcomes that many early observers anticipated” (pp 627). These 
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cognitive consistency studies certainly made progress in our understanding of what debate 
effects occur, and why they do so. However, they are quite limited in their precision and 
specificity. Additionally, they fail to adequately explain who is most likely to engage in the 
attitude reinforcement. Lanoue (1992) is an exception, and uses cognitive consistency to examine 
opinion reinforcement in debates, but also includes political knowledge as a mediating variable. 
Lanoue finds that voters in the lower-middle category of political knowledge are most strongly 
influenced by the debate and its subsequent media coverage. However, motivated reasoning 
would seem to challenge this finding by suggesting that the most politically sophisticated 
individuals are the most likely to employ biases. 
Thus, extant literature on presidential debates is quite diverse. Debates are analyzed from 
a variety of perspectives. Despite the wealth of research, there remains a significant gap in the 
literature. Researchers have yet to adequately and comprehensively explain what debate effects 
are likely to occur, why they happen, and who is most likely to be influenced by the debates. 
Previous psychological and political theories lack the precision and explanatory power to 
sufficiently address each of these concerns. However, motivated reasoning has the potential to 
adequately address these particular issues. The theory suggests that people‟s prior attitudes will 
bias their filtering of political information as they perceive congruent arguments as stronger than 
incongruent arguments. The confirmation and disconfirmation biases provide explanatory 
mechanisms behind the prior-attitude effects and the resulting polarization. However, in this 
project I do not directly test for the seeking out of confirming arguments and the counter arguing 
of incongruent arguments. Most importantly, motivated reasoning goes beyond previous 
presidential campaign debate studies to suggest that the effects will be strongest for the most 
politically interested. 
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Hypotheses 
 Building upon the literature and theory presented, I will test three related hypotheses. 
H1: Prior Attitude Effect: Individuals with prior attitudes (partisans) are more likely to evaluate 
the candidate with congruent attitudes positively than the candidate with incongruent attitudes. 
H2: Polarization: Attitudes towards candidates will become more extreme when partisans have 
been exposed to pro and con arguments in the debate. 
H3: Sophistication and Interest: Effects of biases and polarization in candidate evaluations will 
be stronger for individuals with prior attitudes and high levels of political interest. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA: 
 To test these hypotheses with the presidential campaign debates, I use two separate data 
sets. First, I use a 2008 Los Angeles Times and Bloomberg News panel data set. The pre-debate 
survey was conducted between September 19
th
 and 22
nd
, 2008 and the post-debate survey was 
conducted between September 26
th
 and 28
th,
 2008. The survey was completed using random 
selections of telephone numbers. This sample includes landline and cell phones with listed and 
unlisted phone numbers for the entire nation. The resulting pre-debate sample includes 1,428 
men and women 18 years of age or older. This includes 1,287 registered voters and 838 likely 
voters. The post-debate survey includes a total 701 individuals, with 448 individuals who 
watched the first televised presidential debate in 2008. The debate between Barack Obama and 
John McCain took place on September 26, 2008 at the University of Mississippi. The debate 
primarily consisted of two major themes. Roughly 40% of the debate centered on the financial 
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crisis in the United States, and the remaining 60% of the debate concerned international crises 
including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia. 
 Second, I use a Los Angeles Times panel data set from 1996. The pre-debate survey was 
conducted between October 3
rd
 and October 6
th
, 1996. The post-debate survey was completed 
between October 6
th
 and 7
th
, 1996. The survey was done with telephone interviews of a 
nationwide sample. The pre-debate sample includes 2,298 adults. The post-debate survey 
includes 896 individuals who watched the debate. The debate between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole 
took place on October 6
th
, 1996 in Hartford, Connecticut. The debate covered a variety of 
subjects including the economy, employment, crime, welfare, healthcare, taxation, illegal drugs, 
assault weapons, and international relations. 
Variable Selection: 
 Each of the three hypotheses will be tested with eight different dependent variables. The 
operationalization the dependent variables is discussed in greater detail in the results section. In 
the 2008 study, I employ four dependent variables. The variables are selected and modeled to 
test the change in evaluation of the candidates that occurs after viewing the debate. The first and 
second dependent variables examine the change in affect and feeling towards each candidate 
before and after the debate. The third and fourth dependent variables from the 2008 data reflect 
changes in confidence about each candidate‟s ability to “deal wisely with an international crisis.” 
This variable was selected due to the extensive amount of time spent on international crises 
issues during this particular debate. 
 I also include four dependent variables for testing from the 1996 data set. First, I look at 
the change in perceived attacking. Partisans should reinforce their motivations by shifting 
towards believing that the opposing candidate attacked more in the debate. Next, I examine a 
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variable of Clinton‟s job approval. The third and fourth dependent variables from the 1996 data 
set are built upon the changes in impressions of both Clinton and Dole. Thus, all eight of the 
dependent variables are selected and constructed to assess the change that occurs in different 
types of candidate evaluations after viewing the debate. The distributions of the dependent 
variables are shown in graphics in the Appendix. 
 To address the prior attitudes hypothesis (H1), an independent variable of party 
identification is included. Conceptualization of party identification as a prior attitude, underlying 
motivation, and affective attachment is consistent with other researching employing motivated 
reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006; Gaines et al. 2007; Lebo and Cassino 2007). Individuals 
reporting independent but leaning towards one party are categorized as independents. To address 
political sophistication, a variable of political interest is included. It ranges from very 
uninterested to very interested (higher scores denoting higher levels of interest). In the test of H3, 
partisanship and interest are interacted to gauge the influence of prior attitudes mediated by 
levels of interest. As Barack Obama was campaigning to become the first black President of the 
United States, race was a clear issue in 2008. To control for this, a dichotomous variable of black 
and non-black is included in the 2008 study. The 1996 includes a dichotomous race variable of 
white and non-white. Education is also included as a control variable in the analysis. Finally, pre-
debate affect, confidence, attack, job approval, and impressions are included as controls in their 
respective models. 
 Ordinary least squares regression is used to test the hypotheses and estimate the 
magnitude and direction of influence.  
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RESULTS FROM 2008 DATA: 
 To test the hypotheses, I first examine changes in affect towards Obama. If H1 is 
supported, individuals with prior attitudes should reinforce those attitudes by developing more 
positive feelings toward the candidate with congruent attitudes. Individuals were asked, “Do you 
have a positive or negative feeling about Barack Obama/John McCain? [If yes then] Is it very or 
only somewhat [positive/negative]?” Thus, scores range from very positive (Scored 1) to very 
negative (Scored 5). The same question was asked after the debate. To measure the change, the 
post-debate affect was simply subtracted from the pre-debate affect. This resulted in a scale from 
-4 to 4. Negative scores are examples where the individual had less positive feelings towards 
Obama after the debate, and a positive score reflects more positive feelings after the debate. A 
zero denotes an individual who had no change. Although not explicitly tested in this paper, 
motivated reasoning suggests that this also occurs through the confirming congruent information 
in the debate and resisting disconfirming and incongruent arguments. Here prior attitudes are 
measured with partisanship. In these models, independents are excluded and Democrats are 
coded as a 1 and Republicans are 0. Independents are excluded because they do not possess these 
partisan motivations. H2 will be supported if polarization occurs. More importantly, H3 will be 
supported if there is a significant interaction between interest and party identification that 
reinforces prior attitudes. This would suggest that partisans who are more interested in politics 
should become more polarized in their affect towards Obama after viewing the debate. In sum, 
after viewing the debate Democrats should become more favorable towards Obama and 
Republicans should become less favorable. These effects should be heightened for the most 
interested individuals. 
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 Table 1 shows the regression models for change in affect towards Obama. Model 1 is the 
basic regression without an interaction. Consistent with H1 and significant, Democrats develop 
more positive feelings towards Obama after the debate (Coef. = .955, p < .000). Models 2 and 3 
show the regression, but only for the subsamples of Democrats and Republicans. It is important 
to note the magnitude and direction of the interest coefficient in these models. For Democrats, 
more interested individuals develop more positive affect towards Obama (Coef. = .140, p < 
.159), but interested Republicans develop more negative feelings (Coef. = -.227, p < .133). The 
full model with the interaction between party and interest is seen in Model 4. The interaction is 
significant (p < .050). These models reveal not only that Democrats develop more positive 
feelings and Republicans develop more negative feelings towards Obama, but these effects are 
conditioned by levels of political interest. The most interested partisans have heightened effects. 
Figure 1 provides a clear illustration of the interaction between party identification and political 
interest. It shows the expected values for the change in affect for Obama by party at different 
levels of interest while holding other variables constant. The graphic demonstrates the 
importance of the interaction, and its implications for polarization among the most interested 
respondents. These results provide consistent support for each of the hypotheses. 
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Using the same variable construction as change in affect towards Obama, the tests are 
applied to changes in affect towards McCain. Positive scores reflect the development of more 
positive feelings towards McCain after viewing the debate. The results are in Table 2. Model 1 
shows the basic regression without an interaction. Democrats develop more negative feelings 
towards McCain after viewing the debate (Coef. = -.808, p <  0.000). This lends support to first 
hypothesis. Models 2 and 3 show the influence of interest by party. Among Democrats, more 
interested individuals develop more negative feelings towards McCain (Coef. = -.207, p < .193), 
while interested Republicans become more positive (Coef. = .069, p < .496). The direction of the 
changes for interested partisans is consistent with expectations. The full interaction model is seen 
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in Model 4. The interaction does not reach significance at the .05 level (p = .147). Thus, the 
coefficients concerning the interaction between party and levels of political interest are in the 
direction consistent with the hypotheses, but the interaction is not significant. Figure 2 provides a 
visual display of the interaction. The change in slope for interested Democrats is quite evident in 
the figure. These results lend partial support to the hypotheses. 
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 Next, I turn my analysis to confidence in the candidates‟ ability to “deal wisely with an 
international crisis.” The following variables and models take the same format as the previous 
regressions, with only the dependent variable changing. Here the variables reflect the change in 
confidence in the candidates after viewing the debate. Negative scores report less confidence 
after viewing the debate, and positive scores report more confidence. If consistent with the 
theory and the hypotheses, Democrats should become more confident in Obama after viewing 
the debate and Republicans should become less confident. In Table 3, Model 1 shows the basic 
regression of changes in confidence in Obama to deal wisely with international crises. As 
expected and consistent with hypotheses, Democrats become more confident in Obama after 
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viewing the debate (Coef. = .545, p < 0.000). Model 2 looks at Democrats only, and shows that 
interest has a positive effect (Coef. = .158, p < .035). Model 3 only includes Republicans, and it 
reveals that more interested individuals have less confidence in Obama (Coef. = -.227, p < .008). 
The full model in Model 4 reinforces these results by showing that the interaction between party 
and interest is significant (p < 0.000). Holding all other variables constant, Figure 3 shows the 
interaction between party identification and interest. This graphic, although a bit puzzling, 
highlights the importance of the interaction and the role of interest. Among the very uninterested, 
Republicans actually have more confidence in Obama. However, this relationship reverses and 
polarizes among the most interested. These results provide strong evidence in support of each of 
the hypotheses. 
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 Next, I apply the same methods of analysis to changes in confidence in McCain to handle 
international crises after the debate. In Table 4, Model 1 shows the basic regression without any 
interaction. Democrats have lower levels of confidence in McCain after viewing the debate 
(Coef. = -.476, p < 0.000). Examining only Democrats in Model 2, more interested individuals 
have lower levels of confidence (Coef. = -.122, p < .209). Model 3 shows the results for only 
Republicans, and reveals that more interested individuals have higher levels of confidence (Coef. 
= .076, p < .298). Model 4 shows the interaction between party and interest, and approaches 
significance (p = .094). Figure 4 displays the interaction and buttresses these results. More 
interested Democrats become less confident in McCain to handle international crises after 
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viewing the debate. More interested Republicans become more confident in McCain after 
watching the debate. These results are consistent with the hypotheses and provide evidence of a 
prior attitude effect, polarization, and heightened effects for the most interested citizens. 
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RESULTS FROM 1996 DATA: 
 
 The models for the 1996 data follow a similar pattern as the 2008 models, but with 
different topics. Each of the models will still be testing for a strengthening and reinforcement of 
prior attitudes through biases, a resulting polarization, and heightened effects for the most 
politically interested. First, I examine changes in perceived attacking. In the pre-debate survey, 
respondents were asked “Do you think one candidate will attack his opponent more than the 
other? [If yes] Do you think (Clinton/Dole) will attack somewhat more than (Clinton/Dole), or 
much more?” The respondents were asked a similar question again, but post-debate. The possible 
answers include “Clinton much more,” “Clinton somewhat,” “Neither,” “Dole somewhat,” “Dole 
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much more.” The post-debate scores are subtracted from the pre-debate scores creating a range 
from -4 to 4. Positive scores reflect a change towards believing Clinton attacked more and Dole 
attacked less. Negative scores report a change towards believing Clinton attacked less and Dole 
attacked more. The post-debate question of who attacked more is a seemingly objective question. 
However, motivated reasoning suggests that biases will still influence the processing of political 
information and perception. After viewing the debate, Democrats should shift towards believing 
that Dole attacked more while Republicans should shift towards believing Clinton attacked more. 
Table 5 shows the regression of changes in perceived attacking. Model 1 shows the basic 
regression without an interaction. Democrats shift towards believing Dole attacked more and 
Clinton attacked less than they had originally thought (Coef. = -.534, p < 0.000). Looking at 
Democrats only, Model 2 shows that more interested individuals shift towards believing Dole 
attacked more (Coef. = -.036, p < .611). Model 3 reveals that more interested Republicans shift 
towards believing Clinton attacked more (Coef. = .032, p < .623). The full interaction in Model 4 
is not significant (p < .466). The interaction relationship is also displayed in Figure 5 holding 
other variables constant. These models provide only partial support of the hypotheses. 
Individuals are significantly reinforcing their partisan motivations through biases. Despite seeing 
the same debate, people from each party shift towards perceiving the candidate of the opposing 
party as attacking more. Although not significant, the more interested individuals in the partisan 
subsamples do move in the hypothesized direction. 
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 Next, I examine the change in Clinton‟s job approval after viewing the debate. As the 
incumbent in the campaign, Clinton‟s comments during the debate are likely to be processed and 
taken into account when individuals report their approval of him. Post-debate job approval is 
subtracted from pre-debate approval resulting in a range from -4 to 4. Negative scores reflect a 
change towards becoming less approving and positive scores are more approving. The regression 
models are seen in Table 6. Model 1 shows that Democrats reinforce their motivations by 
becoming more approving of Clinton (Coef. = .744, p < 0.000). Model 2 shows that more 
interested Democrats become slightly less approving (Coef. = -.011, p < .818). This is not 
consistent with the direction of the hypotheses, but it is not significant either. Model 3 reveals 
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that more interested Republicans significantly shift towards becoming less approving of Clinton 
(Coef. = -.213, p < .007). The interaction between party identification and interest is significant 
(p < .036). The graphical display of the interaction in Figure 6 shows that interested Democrats 
do not change much, but interested Republicans are more likely to reinforce their motivations. 
This does provide support for the hypotheses. 
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 The regression models in Table 7 reflect the change in the impression of Clinton after 
watching the debate. Respondents were asked “What is your impression of (Bill Clinton/Bob 
Dole)? As of today, is it very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very 
unfavorable, or haven‟t heard enough about him to say?” Again, post-debate scores are 
subtracted from pre-debate scores creating a range from -4 to 4. Negative scores reflect 
becoming more negative, and positive scores are for a more positive impression of the candidate. 
As hypothesized, Model 1 reveals that Democrats do become significantly more favorable 
towards Clinton (Coef. = -.111, p < 0.000). The subsamples in Models 2 and 3 reveal that more 
interested Democrats become less favorable (Coef. = -.074, p < .156) and more interested 
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Republicans also become less favorable (Coef. = -.143, p < .063). The interested Democrats are 
not moving in the hypothesized direction, but the coefficient is not significant. The interaction 
does not reach significance (p < .502), thus providing only partial support for the hypotheses. 
The interaction relationship is found in Figure 7. 
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 The final dependent variable is tested in a manner similar to the previous model, but now 
for the change in the impression of Dole. Negative scores reflect becoming more negative, and 
positive scores are for a more positive impression of the candidate. Model 1 buttresses the prior 
attitude hypothesis again by showing that Democrats become significantly less favorable towards 
Dole (Coef. = -.442, p < 0.000). Although not significant, interested Democrats do not move in 
the hypothesized direction. Instead they become more favorable towards Dole (Coef. = .006, p < 
.953). Model 3 reveals that interested Republicans also become more favorable towards Dole 
after viewing the debate (Coef. = .074, p < .278). The interaction between party and interest is 
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not significant (p < .738), and is shown in Figure 8. Again, these 1996 models only provide 
partial support of the hypotheses. 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
 The purpose of this study was to provide a test and extension of the motivated reasoning 
theory and fill gaps in the existing presidential campaign debate literature concerning how 
individuals process information. Motivated reasoning provides a solid explanatory mechanism 
for understanding what debate effects will occur, why they happen, and who is most likely to be 
influenced. This paper extends the theory outside of the laboratory and applies it to a national 
sample. In doing so, the paper provides a test of the prior attitude, polarization, and heightened 
effects for political sophisticates hypotheses. 
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 In sum, this paper finds support for each of the hypotheses. Prior attitudes, as measured 
by party identification, are significant predictors in every model in both data sets. Party 
identification acts as a conscious and unconscious affective attachment that influences how 
individuals process political information. People‟s affect, confidence, impressions, perceptions 
of attacking, and presidential approval are reinforced and strengthened through their partisan 
perceptions of the debates. The confirmation and disconfirmation biases supported in previous 
literature, although not explicitly tested here, provide explanatory mechanisms for the 
strengthening of beliefs and the polarization. Individuals reinforce prior attitudes through their 
biased filtering of information in the debate by clinging to congruent arguments and counter-
arguing incongruent arguments. 
Perhaps most importantly, this paper finds evidence for heightened effects among the 
most politically interested. In the 2008 data, the interaction between party identification and 
interest is significant in two of the four models at the .05 level (three of the models at the .1 
level). Although not always statistically significant, the effects of the interaction move in the 
hypothesized direction in every instance in the 2008 data. Evidence in the 1996 data is more 
mixed. In the perceptions of attacking, interested partisans move in the hypothesized direction, 
but neither their shift nor the interaction is significant. For Clinton‟s job approval, interest does 
not appear to matter for Democrats, but more interested Republicans become significantly less 
approving. The interaction effect for job approval is also significant. Interest does not seem to 
matter for Democrats in their change in impression of Clinton either. However, interested 
Republicans do become significantly less approving. The changes in impression of Dole after 
viewing the debate do not yield any significant results for the hypotheses. Although not 
presented here, regressions performed for independents (or individuals without a partisan 
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motivation) are not significant and are not conditioned by levels of interest. Taken together, 
individuals are biased processors of campaign debate information. People selectively filter the 
debate information to reinforce their prior attitudes. More so, the individuals who are most likely 
to bias their perception of the debates are often the most politically interested. 
 These results have important implications for political science research. First, they speak 
to the ability of individuals to even-handedly process information and form objective 
evaluations. People are unconsciously motivated reasoners, and as such, they are biased 
processors of information. Second, the results have implications for political learning. A large 
body of the presidential campaign debate literature concerns the ability of debates to foster 
learning and the development of political knowledge. Although factual knowledge is not tested 
directly here, the results do point to the possibility that motivations could bias political learning. 
This is consistent with other research that demonstrates that interpretations of facts are 
influenced by partisan motivations (Gaines et al. 2007). 
Third, despite a consensus about elites, there remains a critical debate in the literature 
surrounding polarization at the mass level (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Claassen and 
Highton 2009; Fiorina et al. 2008). For the polarization that is documented in the mass public, 
this paper suggests an explanatory mechanism. People continually reinforce their attitudes 
through an unconscious process filled with biases. Fourth, with polarization comes difficulty in 
compromise. This paper reveals that the most politically interested individuals are likely to be 
the most polarized. That is, our ideal citizens are the least likely to moderate opinions and form 
compromises. This suggests implications not only for public opinion, but policy formation and 
political decision making as well. 
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Finally, this paper increases our understanding of the function of political interest. Kinder 
(2003, p. 377) states “That some Americans are deeply interested in politics while others 
couldn‟t care less is widely appreciated, but how this difference is implicated in citizen‟s 
vulnerability to media influence is unclear.” When conceptualized as a facet of political 
sophistication, political interest can be united with motivated reasoning and understood as a 
factor that accentuates biases in the processing of information. 
 Motivated reasoning presents an opportunity to disentangle the mechanisms through 
which individuals process a myriad of political phenomena. This paper displays its utility to 
enhance our understanding of how individuals respond to presidential campaign debates. The 
strong evidence presented here, in addition to previous literature, bolsters motivated reasoning 
and provides a starting point for further application of the theory beyond the laboratory. 
 
APPENDIX 
Below are the distributions of the eight dependent variables. 
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